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ant is entitled to have it put if he so wishes. 1 therefore give
judgment for the plaintiffs with costs, subject to the condition that
if the defendant elect within ten days after my judgment to have
a new trial he may do so, and in that event the costs of the former
trial, and of the further consideration, should abide the event of
the second trial.
Judgment for the plaintiffs.
This case seems to have been decided
mainly upon a distinction between bills
and notes on the one hand, and checks
on the other. And it was long ago
established in America that, whatever
might be the law as to bills and notes,
a cheek need not be presented for payment in-tanter : and that if taken bona
though some time after its date, it
ti
would not neccsarilv be subjected to
any equities between the maker and the
original payee: In re Brown, 2 Story
502 (1843); An s v. Jeleeam, 98 Mass.
294 ; Frst Natlonal Bank v. Harris,
108 Ioss. 514 ; Lester v. Givens, 8

erally are, the note need not be presented immediately; and that a bonafide
holder of a note on demand, though
taken in several days alter date, does
not bold it subject to any unknown
equities between the prior parties. It is
quite sufficient if the note was purchased
within "a reasonable time" after date,
in order to give the holder a perfect
claim. And what is. a reasonable time,
is a question of law for the colirt, as generally considered, and not of fact for the
jury. And while seven days, or even one
month, have been thought not too long
(Tlowston v. McKoen, 6 Mass. 428 ;

Bush

Hotailing,

Ranger v. Cary, 1 L1ct. 369 ; Seaver v.

40 Cal. 111.
Although, of course, as explained in
the principal case, the time of taking
might be so long after its date as to
create a presumption of fact against the
holder which lie might be bound to
explain: Cowing v. Altinan, 71 N. Y.
441. But whether there is or is not
any difference between bills and notes,
and checks, where both are payable on
thne, as to the necessity of a prompt
demand, it is clear that even in notes
payable on d aand, as the check in the
principal ease was, and as they gen-

Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267), yet six years,
eleven months, eight months, six
months, three and a half months have
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been held too late:
Stoclbridge v.
Damon, 5 Pick. 523; Sylvester v.
Cropo, 15 Id. 92; American Bank v.
Jeaners. 2 Met. 288; Fild v. Niclersoa, 13 Mass. 131 ; Tlennpson v.
Hull, 6 Pick. 258; Sevens v. Bruce, 21

Id. 193. Whether the same rule applies
to bills of exchange on demand, as to
promissory notes of that character, is not
so well settled.

AMERICAN

EDMUND H.

BENNETT.

DECISIONS.

Circuit Court, Southern District, New York.
FLAGG

ET AL. V.

MANHATTAN RAILWAY CO.

ET AL.

An agreement between two corporations, whereby one guaranties the other a
certain specified annual dividend on its capital stock, is a guaranty to the corporation and not to the stockholders severally, although a memorandum of it is endorsed
on each share of stock.
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In such a case the directors of the corporation to whom the guaranty is made
have power to modify the terms of such guaranty without asking consent of the

stockholders, and where such power is fairly exercised, in view of all the circumstances, and in good faith, a court will not interfere, even though, on the same
facts, it might have arrived at a different conclusion.
Where an agreement is made by the directors, relinquishing the right to such
guaranty, the execution of the agreement will not be enjoined at the suit of a stockholder because three of the directors voting were also stockholders in the guarantor
corporation, it appearing that without counting their votes a majority of the directors
voted for the measure.
MOTION for a preliminary injunction on a bill in equity by the
holders of four shares of stock of the Metropolitan Elevated Railway against the said company and two other companies, known
respectively as the Manhattan and the New York Elevated Railway
Companies, setting forth substantially the following facts :
Both the MAetropolitan and the New York companies owned lines of
elevated railways in the city of New York. The Manhattan company
owned no line of railway, but was empowered by its charter to lease
and operdte elevated railways. Its capital stock was $13,000,000,
and its directors persons who wre directors of the other two companies. On May 20th 1879, the three companies entered into a
tripartite agreement, which recited that it was for the interest of
the Metropolitan and New York roads, and of the general public,
that the two lines of railway should be run under one management,
and which provided that the Metropolitan and New York companies agreed to lease their roads to the Manhattan company, and
the Manhattan company agreed to execute two bonds, one to a
trustee for the Metropolitan company for $6,500,000, and the other
to a trustee for the New York company for a like amount, which
bonds were to be exchangeable for stock of the Manhattan company at par, the Metropolitan and New York companies thus
becoming practically the owners of the Manhattan stock. There
was also a provision that whenever the Manhattan should declare
a larger dividend on its own stock than ten per cent., it should
increase the dividends of tbe other roads to an equal extent. On
the same day the leases pvovided for by the agreement were
executed. Each lease stipulated for the payment by the Manhattan company to the lessor company, 1st, of a nominal rental; 2d,
of the principal and interest of the bonded inddbtedness of the
lessor company; and 3d, of an annual dividend of ten per cent.
on the capital stock of the lessor company to the amount of
$6,500,000, a guarantee of which by the Manhattan company was
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to be endorsed on the certificates of said stock. Each lease also
contained a clause of forfeiture and right of re-entry for failure to
perform its covenants. Under these leases the Manhattan took
possession of and operated the roads, while the other two companies
disposed of the Manhattan stock to the general public by sale in
the market. On July 2d 1881 proceedings were commenced in the
Supreme Court of New York, on behalf of the state of New York,
against the Manhattan company to obtain its dissolution, on the
ground that it had become insolvent and operating the leased
roads at a loss. Under these proceedings the court, on July 13th,
appointed a receiver of the Manhattan company. On July 23d
1881 the New York company presented a petition in said proceeding to have their lease declared forfeited, and for a delivery to
them of their railway. On October 14th 1881 the court refused
the prayer of the petition on the ground that the capital stock
of the Manhattan having been transferred to, and sold by, the New
York and Metropolitan roads, the innocent purchasers of such stock
might, under the circumstances of the case, have claims against
the latter roads, which should be passsed upon before the prayer of
the petition should be granted.

Judge WESTBROOK,who delivered

the opinion saying, " Is it not most apparent that the innocent
holders and purchasers of the stock of the Manhattan company
have grave questions to submit to the courts, both as against the
lessor companies and also their stockholders who placed the Manhattan stock upon the market to their great injury. * * * It is
plain that they should not be ignored and the property asked for,
surrendered upon the ground of the non-payment of obligations
incurred by the lease when perhaps a trial of the action pending
may determine that the Manhattan company is not a debtor to
but a creditor of the petitioner." On October 22d 1881 a new
tripartite agreement was made between the three companies
which set forth that it had been found impracticable to carry
out the various terms and conditions imposed by the original
agreement and leases on the Manhattan, and that the interests of
the parties and of the public required that the roads should be run
under one management, and providing that the leases should be
modified so that the Manhattan should pay out of the moneys
received from operating the railways after payment of expenses
and taxes: 1st, To the New York company all moneys due under
the original lease on July 1st 1881 ; 2d, To the Metropolitan
VOL. X
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company the interest due on its bonds from January 1st 1881;
3d, To the payment of interest on the bonds of the Metropolitan
and New York; 4th, To the payment of the nominal rental stipulated
for in said leases; 5th, To the payment to the New York company
of a dividend of six per cent. on its stock; and 6th, To the payment
to the Metropolitan of a dividend of six per cent. on its stock, the
payments to be made and to have preference over each other in
the order above enumerated. On the same day a supplemental
agreement was executed by the three companies providing that the
Manhattan should pay to the New York all sums due and owing
under its lease up to and including October 1st 1881, and also that
the payment of the dividends to the New York company should be
cumulative, and the sums to be paid for dividends only to be payable out of moneys received from the operation of the road prior
to the dates at which the sums should grow due under the agreement. To enjoin the execution of these agreements the present
bill was filed by stockholders of the Metropolitan on behalf of
themselves and of all other stockholders who might join. It
alleged that immediately after the execution of the original tripar.
tite agreement the following guarantee was endorsed on the stock
certificates of the Metropolitan company, viz. " The. Manhattan
Railway Company for value received has agreed to pay to the
'letropolitan Elevated Railway Company an amount equal to ten
per cent. per annum on the capital stock of the latter companythat is to say on $6,500,000, payable quarterly, commencing
January 1st 1880;" that complainants purchased their stock
with knowledge of the provisions of the original tripartite agreement and on the faith of this guaranty ; that during the pendency
of the negotiations for the second tripartite agreement it was given
out and complainants expected that the terms of any arrangement
which should be concurred in should be submitted to the stockholders for approval, but that this had not been done; that the
agreements of October 22d 1881 subordinated the rights of the
Metropolitan company to those of the New York company, and
released the Manhattan company from its guaranty; that the officers of the Metropolitan had betrayed its interests; that at an
election of directors, held in July 1881, Russell Sage and Jay
Gould became for the first time directors of the Metropolitan ; that
the Manhattan being shortly thereafter placed in the' hands of the
receivers, its shares became depressed in value and were largely
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purchased by Jay Gould ; that on October 8th 20,000 shares stood
in his name, 1000 in the name of his son, 1100 in the name of
IV. E. Connor and 12,400 in the name of IV. E. Connor & Co., in
which firm Gould was a partner ; that all of said shares were held
in the interest of Gould ; that Russell Sage, who was also president
of the Metropolitan, and as such executed the agreement of October
22d 1881, was largely interested in stock of the Manhattan; that
both Gould and Sage took an active and the principal part in the
negotiations which led to the agreements of October 22d 1881;
that the negotiations on the part of the New York company were
conducted by its president, Cyrus W. Field, who was also largely
interested in Manhattan stock ; and that the agreements of October
22d 1881 were corruptly executed for the personal ends of the
signers of the same. The bill further charged that the Metropolitan, about November 1st 1879, executed a second mortgage for
54,600,000, only $2,000,000 of the bonds of which had been issued,
and that the company proposed to deliver the balance of the bonds
to the Ianhattan for negotiation, the latter company to receive the
proceeds; and that the board of directors of the Metropolitan, by
cancelling the guarantee of the Manhattan on the bonds of the
company as the same were transferred, and in various other ways,
were endeavoring to compel dissentient shareholders to acquiesce
in the terms of the said agreements.
The bill prayed for a decree that the agreements of October 22d
were null and void, and for an injunction to prevent the companies
from carrying out the same.
S. P. Lash, for plaintiffs.

D. D. Field, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BLATCHFOnD, C. J. (after stating the facts.)-The principal

ground urget in support of the motion is that the agreements
of October 22d impair vested rights of the stockholders of the
Metropolitan ; that each stockholder has for himself such vested
rights, and that these rights cannot be impaired as to him without his consent. It is urged that after the Metropolitan lease
was executed there was no property left to it upon which anything in the nature of a divided-paying stock could be based,
except the revenue to be derived from the terms of the lease; that
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the value of the capital stock consisted wholly in such revenue;
that the $162,500 to be paid quarterly to the Metropolitan was
the only profit which investors in the stock could hope to realize
from their investment ; that the stock is stock of a special character,
entitled to an agreed portion of a rental to be paid by the Manhattan ; that the agreement of the Manhattan is truly expressed in
the memorandum on the certificates; that, by the whole transaction,
the Metropolitan agrees to distribute such portion of the rental as
a dividend among its stockholders ; that the Metropolitan, therefore, cannot surrender the guaranty of the Manhattan; that such
guaranty must be regarded as a promise to the Metropolitan for the
benefit of its stockholders; and that they are entitled to prevent
the Metropolitan from diverting the fund or impairing the contract
out of which the right to it comes.
It is undoubtedly true that the object of the provisions of the
lease in regard to the 10 per cent. per annum on $6,500,000, to
be paid by the Manhattan to the Metropolitan, was to enable the
stockholders of the Metropolitan to have, if possible, during the
continuance of the lease, a quarterly dividend of 2 per cent. on
their stock. But I fail to see any contract to that effect between the
Manhattan and the individual stockholders of the Metropolitan,
or between such stockholders and the Metropolitan. The language
of article 2 of the lease is that the Manhattan guaranties to the
.Metropolitan an annual dividend of ten per cent. on the capital
stock of the Metropolitan to the amount* of $6,500,000, that is
to say, the guaranty is to the Metropolitan, not to its stockholders
severally. The article then goes on to interpret the guaranty, and
to show what it is, and at what times payments under it are to be
made. It says, "that is to say," the Manhattan will, each and
every year during the term beginning with October 1st 1879, pay
to the Metropolitan $650,000, free of all taxes, in equal quarterly
paymefits of $162,500 each, on the first days of January, April,
July and October in each year, the first to be made January 1st
1880. There is no agreement, either by the Manhattan or the
Metropolitan, that these sums shall be paid to the stockholders
of the Metropolitan. Then there is the further provision that the
Manhattan will, from time to time, execute in proper form a guaranty "to the above effect," printed or engraved on the certificates
of stock of the Metropolitan, and, as such stock certificates are
surrendered for cancellation and reissue, will, from time to time,
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at the request of the holder, "renew such guaranty" upon all
reissued certificates. This was never done. The Manhattan never
executed anything on the certificates. The Metropolitan issued
the certificates with an unexecuted memorandum, which does not
contain the word "guaranty," and contains no contract or agreement or guaranty of any kind, but only a statement that the Manhattan has agreed to pay to the Metropolitan an amount equal to
10 per cent. per annum on the capital stock of the 'Metropolitan ;
that is to say, on the $6,500,000, payable quarterly, commencing
January 1st 1880. This was the interpretation put at the time
on the agreement of the Manhattan by the Metropoli.tan, and
accepted by each stockholder of the Metropolitan when he took
his certificate. If any stockholder was entitled, on a request to the
Manhattan, to a guaranty of any kind executed by it on his certificate of stock, he waived his right to it. But,'if he had asked
for and received it, it would have been "a guaranty to the above
effect," being a repetition of the agreement to make the quarterly
payments to the Metropolitan; that is, an agreement to do what
the memorandum states that the Manhattan had agreed to do.
This would not have been any more of a contract between the
Manhattan and the stockholder, or between the Metropolitan and
the stockholder, than now exists.
The case, therefore, is not one of any vested right in the stockholders of the Metropolitan to the 10 per cent. payments, but it
depends on the general power of the directors of a corporation to
make and modify its contracts. That power is well established in
this state : foyt v. Thopso's Pxr's, 19 N. Y. 207, 216. Nor
can the stockholders control that power: 1lc Cullough v. "1Ioss, 5
Denio 566, 575. No statute or authority is referred to which
makes it necessary to the validity of the agreements of October
22d that they should have been approved by any one or more
stockholders.
The leases and the tripartite agreement and the agreements of
October 22d were made under the authority of the Act of April
23d 1839 (Laws of New York, 1839, c. 218, p. ]95), which provides that "it shall be lawful hereafter for any railroad corporation
to contract with any other railroad corporation for the use of their
respective roads, and thereafter to use the same in such manner as
may be prescribed in such contract." There is nothing to impeach
the validity of that statute. The instruments referred to are con-
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tracts by the Manhattan and the other two companies for the use
by the former of the roads of the latter, on terms satisfactory to
each of the latter, as determined by the votes of their boards of
directors.
It is urged that the question should be considered as if the
Metropolitan, on the failure of the Manhattan to fulfil its covenants
in the lease, had re-entered, and as if the question were as to a
new lease, with terms such as now obtain in the lease as modified.
In this view the new lease is objected to as ultra vires, because it
appropriates the revenues of the Metropolitan, as a part of the
general funds of the Manhattan, to pay preferred dividends to the
New York. The contention is that the Manhattan is to receive
all the earnings of the lines of the Metropolitan, and, after paying
expenses, taxes, interest, etc., is to pay, first, a dividend of 6 per
cent. on the stock of the New York ; and that, as the earnings of
the Metropolitan are not to be kept separate, no such arrangement
can be made without the consent of the stockholders of the Metropolitan. The question is not one of power, but of good faith.
If, in good faith, the discretion and judgment of the directors of
the Metropolitan were fairly exercised, under the circumstances in
which the affairs of the corporation were at the time, in view of all
its embarrassments, and of the condition of the Manhattan, and of the
litigations existing and threatened, ana of the claims made against
the Metropolitan and its stockholders by the Manhattan and the
stockholders of the Manhattan, and of the relative conditions of
the two properties, and of the past and the probable prospective
earnings of the roads of the New York and the Metropolitan, no
court will undertake to interfere with the exercise of such discretion and judgment, even though on the same facts, it might have
arrived or may arrive at a different conclusion, and even though the
stockholders of the Metropolitan might have arrived at a different
conclusion. In this view the remarks cited from the decision of
Judge WESTBLOos become of great importance.

His views in regard

to the claim of the Manhattan for the $13,000,000 were calculated
to have great weight, and it is shown they did have great weight in
regard to some of the terms of a new arrangement. The Manhattan had made two defaults in paying the dividend rentals, it had
been put into the hands of receivers, it was alleged to be insolvent,
and it was asserting the claims for $13,000,000. It was perfectly
clear that the interests of the public demanded that the two elevated
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roads should be under one management, and the interests of the
public were the interests of the two lessor companies. The state of
things was such that the common manager must be the Manhattan.
Therefore, its obligations to the other two companies must be
modified, because they were too onerous to be fulfilled. The only
question was as to the new obligations. The evidence satisfactorily
shows that the roads of the Metropolitan were not earning enough
net money, over expenses, repairs and taxes, to pay the interest
on its mortgdige bonds, and that the New York was earning at
least 6 per cent. net, and enough more to make reasonable the
preferences given to it over the Metropolitan in the new arrangement. By that agreement the claims of the Manhattan for the
813,000,000 are released. But whatever conclusion now a judicial tribunal would come to, on proofs, as to whether the new
arrangement was a wise and proper one for the Metropolitan to
make, it is sufficient to say that, on the evidence now presented as
to what was before the directors of the Metropolitan, and as to
their action, they had a right to think, in good faith, that they
were doing what was most judicious for their stockholders, and
they did what they did in good faith.
It is contended that a fictitious necessity was created, and that
the stockholders of the Manhattan would have come forward to
extricate it from its difficulties. I see no evidence of this. The
directors of the Metropolitan had this question before them, necessarily, and passed upon it and acted in view of it.
It is alleged in the bill that Messrs. Sage and Gould, while
acting as directors of the Metropolitan to make the new arrangement in its behalf, were large holders of the stock of the Manhattan
Company, and that Mr. Field was at the time a large shareholder
in the Manhattan. The directors of the Metropolitan who voted to
approve the agreement of October 22d were Messrs. Sage, Gould,
Oonnor, Sloan, Dillon, Navarro, Stout, Dodge and Porter. Mr.
Garrison was absent. Mr. Kneeland voted in the negative. Leaving out Messrs. Sage, Gould and Connor, six of the ten present
voted in favor of the agreement. As to the supplemental agreement, there were ten directors present, Mr. Sloan being absent.
Mr. Stout did not vote. Of the nine voting, Messrs. Sage, Gould,
Dillon, Navarro, Connor, Dodge, Porter and Garrison voted to
approve the supplemental agreement, and Mr. Kneeland voted in
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the negative. Leaving out Messrs. Sage, Gould and Connor, five
of the nine voting voted to approve the supplemental agreement.
There were eleven directors in all. Nothing is alleged in impeachment of the positions of Messrs. Sloan, Dillon, Navarro, Garrison,
Stout, Dodge or Porter. Therefore, whatever may be shown as
to the positions of Messrs. Gould, Sage and Connor, the legal
aspect of the transaction is not affected.
Mr. Gould was elected a director of the Metropolitan on July 9th
1881. He states that at the time of making the 'settlement of
October 22d he had an interest of 2500 shares in the Metropolitan,
and of 5000 shares in the New York, his cash investment for the
two being $710,354.21, while his actual cash investment in the
Manhattan was $599,031.25.
Mr. Sage states that at the time of the agreement of October 22d
he held about 1200 shares of stock in the Metropolitan. He was
appointed president of the Metropolitan in July, 1881. lie says
,that at that time he had about 800 shares of the Manhattan stock,
but within a few days thereafter "was short" of Manhattan stock,
and from that time until after the agreement of October 22d bought
no stock of the Manhattan, nor became interested in any except
for the purpose of fulfilling previous contracts ; and that his pecuniary interest, if he "had any during the period, was to raise the
price of Metropolitan stock and depress the price of Manhattan
stock."
Mr. Field states that he sold out all his Manhattan stock, except
13 shares, in November, 1879, and sold those in March, 1880; and
that he never bought or became interested again in Manhattan
stock until October, 1881, after.he "became convinced that a compromise would be made." But he sustained no fiduciary relation
to the stockholders of the Metropolitan.
The concurrent testimony is that the Manhattan is now entirely
solvent; made so, it is true, by the new arrangement; but still solvent. It is out of the hands of the receivers. The tripartite
agreement and the leases, except as modified, are in force, and are
in force as modified. The mortgage bonds, the issuing of which
is sought to be restrained, are to be issued, it appears, under the
tripartite agreement and the leases, and pursuant to resolutions
passed before the agreement of October 22d, and their proceeds
are to be used in perfecting the structure and equipment of the

FLAGG v. MANHATTAN RAILWAY CO.

Mletropolitan, and in securing the safety of those who travel on
the road.
The motion for an injunction is denied.
This important decision affects the security of large amounts of money invested
on the faith of the general opinion that
such contracts cannot be impaired without the consent of the holder of such
securities. Experience has demonstrated that in leases fairly entered into,
the value to the general bnsiness of the
lessee requires performance in the interest of creditors of the lessee even after
insolvency and although the direct earnings may not equal the rental.
The result is more marked in the
present case, because the guaranty of a
dividend of ten per cent. under the
tripartite lease or agreement of May
1879 between the Metropolitan Railway,
the New York Railway (the two companies owning the New York elevated
roads) and the Manhattan company,
was (in accordance with a stipulation contained in the agreement) printed on the
tace of each certificate of shares in the
Metropolitan issued and reissued to purchasers after the consummation of that
agreement.
This case supports the methods, by
which this guaranty was abrogated by
the directors of the two companies, as
well as the right of the directors to do so.
The release of the guarantied ten per
cent. dividend by the subsequent agreement of October 1881, which, quoting
from the language of the judge "appropriated the revenues of the Metropolitan as a part of the general funds
of the Manhattan to pay preferred
dividends to the New York Railway
Company," was carried into effect
by
the aid of the votes of Russell Sage, the
president of the Metropolitan, and of Jay
Gould and Connor, three directors of the
Metropolitan, who were each interested
in stock of the Manhattan. It was also
alleged in the bill that "'Gould and Sage
took an active and principal part in the
Von. XX.-99

negotiations which led to the agreement,"
Gould was also interested in the stock
of both the other companies. These directors were incapable of taking any part in
the negotiation-of a transaction which
directly benefited themselves. A director,
according to the opinion of WELCH, J.,
'in Goodia v. C. I. 6- C. Co., 18 Ohio
St. 169, "as soon he finds he has personal interests which are in conflict with
those of the company ought to resign,"
and the contract in that case was set
aside at the suit of a stockholder on
account of such interest.
The court supports the action of the
board of directors in releasing the right
to the preferred dividend, because independently of those directors so voting and
disqualified, because interested adversely
in the subject of the contract, the six
other directors voting for it constituted
a majority of the board, and they do
not appear to have had any such adverse
interest.
It does not appear that these six directors had any interest in the company
of which they were directors. Such an
interest is in no sense essential to their
acting as directors, but was a material
subject of inquiry in the case because
the transaction was attacked by stockholders of the Metropolitan as made in
bad fiaith. In fact the bill set up that it
was a betrayal of their true interests.
In a question between a third party
contracting with the Metropolitan Railway, who set up the invalidity of the
agreement on account of the interest
of the three directors, the answer would
have been that the agreement was valid
because executed by a majority of the
board, without the three interested ones ;
this was the view in the Rolling Stock
Co. v. The Railroad, 34 Ohio St. 465.
It does not follow even from that case
that if stockholders had dissented it
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would have bound them. In the absence
of dissent on the part of their principals
even the action of the three interested
directors was valid as to strangers.
Does this rule apply where the plaintiffs, stockholders of the Metropolitan,
complained that their interests had been
sacrificed in the arrangement by two
of their fellow stockholders, also directors, who, holding adverse interests, not
only voted as directors and influenced
the other members, but also were active
parties in bringing about the arrangement, and by a third director who appeared to be interested to the extent of
12,000 shares in the stock of the Manhattan company, the lessee. In the case
of Butts v. Wood, 38 Barb. 181, the
action of the majority of two in a
board composed of three, passing upon
the claim of the third director who also
voted, was set aside at the instance of
one of the stockholders.
There was,
however, in this case a family relationship between the members.
This case therefore presents a different
question, and the legality of the action
of the Board so circumstanced, we think
will not be found to depend upon the
fact that a majority of the Board were
not disqualified by interests from voting.
The facts as presented do not show that
the interest of Sage and Gould or of Connor was knoWn to the other directors ;
this was a material fact, as to the action
of a board which is consulting and
advisory as to the action of its officers.
"For," says GaovxR, J., in Oqden v.
.3urray,39 X. Y. 202, "1the shareholders
of a corporation are entitled not only
to the votes of the directors whom they
have appointed, but also to their influence and argument in the discussion
which leads to the passage of their resolutions:" Aberdeen Railway Co. v.
Blakie, 1 Macqueen H. L. Gas. 461.
And where the president and tvo directors of the railroad company subsequently
became stockholders in the construction
company, it was held the stockholders

might ratify or disaffirm ; but a ratification in ignorance of the material facts
did not estop them: Kelly v. The Railroad Co., 77 Ill. 426.
When it is considered that the board
is nominated and elected by the holders
of the controlling interest in the stock,
that often a majority of the directors
have but a nominal interest in the company, that they must naturally be influenced by those holding the controlling
interest, then such directors should bo
held strictly to the limit of power growing out of agency in joint associations
for trading purposes, and the question
of mala fides becomes immaterial, from
the absolute necessity of treating such
transactions as fraudulent per se and
voidable as other transactions entirely
blameless in themselves are treated under
the statutes of fraud, on account of their
liability to gross abuse, and for the protection of society: Michoud v. Girod, 4
How. 554; Cuniberland Coal Co. v. Sherman, 20 Barb. 553 ; Aberdeen Railway
Co. v. Blakie, 1 Macqueen H. L. Gas.
461.
The rights of stockholders inter se are
not governed in respect to the action of
the Board by the same rules as govern
dealings with strangers.
For the rights of the stockholders
among themselves, in their relation to
the governing body, we look to the law
of partnership and of agency growing
out of it. Stockholders are treated in
this respect exactly as partners.
Directors are agents of the corporation, and as such are agents of the stockholders, but agents of the whole body of
stockholders, of the minority as well as
of the majority which elects them.
"1The directors are the trustees or managing partners, and the stockholders are
cestui que trust, and have a j6int interest
in all the property and effects of the corporation :" Koehler v. Black River Fall
iron Co., 2 Black 720; Cumberland
Coal Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553.
BLACKBnURN, J:, says in Taylor v. Chi-
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J1qcr Raibcay Co., L. R., 2 Exch.
378, "as the shareholders are in substance partners in a trading concern, the
management of which is committed to
the body corporate, a trust is by implication created in favor of the shareholders,
that the corporation will manage the corporate affairs, and apply the corporate
funds for the purpose of the original
speculation. The rights thus conferred
on the shareholders as between them and
the corporation are very analogous to
tho~e between partners, and like those,
depend upon the terms on which the
parties entered into the joint speculation.
Any shareholder has a right to object to
any act being done which is in contravention of the tights thus given to him.
Though the majority of the shareholders
or even all but himself approved, yet
lie has a right to object to the making or
the enforcing of a contract to do any
unauthorized act which would affect his
individual interest," and he- cites the
opinion of the Vice-Chancellor (KiN-DEISLEY) in The Earl qf Srrewsbury
v. Xor/h 5rto l'orlsire Railway Co., 35
L. J. Ch. 172 : " I am of opinion that
neither the majority of directors nor the
vote of the majority of shareholders at
a general meeting could authorize the
application of any part of the funds of
the company to the purchase of such,
or countenance and support it even as
against a single dissentient stockholder."
So in Pick(ring v. Stephonson, L. R., 14
Eq. 322, speaking of the powers of the
directors of a railway company at p. 340
the Vice-Chancellor says : "The principle of jurisprudence which I ara asked
here to apply is that the governing body
of a corporation which is in fact a trading partnership, &c."
This principle is fully set forth in the
late work on private corporations by
Morawetz. Applying this principle to the
riglht of the minority or of any one comploining stockholder in the present case,
it is clear that neither of the interested
stockholders could as lartners in a trad-

ing company have voted or influenced
the action of the joint concern in a contract to which they were parties on the
other side, and what they could not do
themselves they could not do through
their agents, the governing body, against
the consent of copartners : Blad v. Del.
4- R. Canal Co., 24 N. J. ]Eq. 453.
"Directors," says Mr. Justice DAVIs,
in Koehler v. Blac River Fall Iron Co.,
2 Black 720, " cannot thus deal with
the important inferests intrusted to their
management ; they hold a place of trust,
and by accepting the trust are obliged to
execute it with fidelity not for their own
benefit but for the benefit of tlhe stockholders of the corporation."
Notably was this principle applied in
Card v. Hope, 2 B. & C. 661, where
the majority owners of a ship who by
the sale of their shares on condition that
a certain person should go as master, by
this agreement disqualified themselves
from an exercise of their judgment in
the choice of a master which the other
owners were entitled to expect.
So also in Cumberland Coal Co. v.
Sherman, 30 Barb. 553, per DAvis, J. :
"There can be no question I think at
the present that a director of a corporation is the agent or trustee of the stockholders, and as such has duties to
discharge of a fiduciary character towards his principal."
The board is a unit, the action of the
board is the act of all the members; it
binds those absent and those voting in
the negative, and they are the agents of
each and every stockholder, and it reasonably follows' they cannot create by
their vote an interest adverse to any one
stockholder, whether in favor of a stockholder or of a director, any more than a
majiority of the stockholders could at a
meeting of the corporators.
In this view of the absence of evidence
of bad faith, or evidence of good faith
in the transaction, is immaterial. In
such transactions it is found that the
consciences of men will not stand the
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strain of self interest, and courts will
not inquire whether the transaction
was a beneficial one or not for the corporation. "Constituted as humanity
is, in the majority of cases duty would be
overborne in the struggle." Marsh v.
Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178-183. For this
reason Mr. Justice FiELD says: "the
law therefore will always condemn the
transactions in his own behalf; when, in
respect to the matter concerned, he is the
agent of others and will relieve against
them whenever their enforcement is
neasonably resisted. See also lichoud
v. Girod, 4 How. 503.
For the same reason a director cannot
purchase the rolling stock at a judicial
sale. Ie cannot represent the company
in transactions with another company in
which he is shareholder; nor can the
same persons act as agent of different
companies in their mutual transactions:
Mlorawetz on Private Corporations, sec.
245 and cases cited.
What one joint owner or corporator
could not do to bind the joint concern,
he cannot do by a body acting as his
agents. The three directors who were
concerned in interest in the other companies could not vote, advise and influence
the making of the agreement of October
1881, and the other directors were incompetent to make a contract beneficial
to one or more of their own number.
The fact that these three directors
who had an interest in the subject-matter
of the contract, constituted only a minority of the Board, does not validate the
action of the Board. In the well-considered case of Cumberland Coal Co. v.
Sherman, 30 Barb. 553, this subject was
carefully considered and the following
remarks are applicable : "INeither are
the duties or the obligations of a lirector
or trustee altered from the circumstance
that he is one of a number of trustees,
and that this circumstance diminishes
"hisresponsibility or relieves him from any
incapacity to deal with the property of
his cestui que trust. The same principle

applies to him as one of a number as if
he was acting as a sole trustee.
In the Aberdeen Railway Co. v.
Blalde, 1 lacqueen H. L. Cas. 461,
it was held that it made no difference
whether the party whose act or contract
is called in question is only one of a
body of directors, not a sole trustee or
manager. "It was Mr. Blakic's duty to
give to his co-directors and through them
to the company the full benefit of all the
knowledge and skill which he could
bring to bear on the subject. He was
bound to assist them in getting the
articles contracted for at the cheapest possible rate, as far as related to the advice
he should give them he put his interest
in conflict with his duty, and whether he
was sole director or one of many can
make no difference."
Whether the American courts will
hold as the House of Lords did in that
case, that any contract by a railway company with a firm in which a director
was co-partner is void, may be doubted:
Ashhurst's Appeal, 60 Penn. St. 290.
The RbIlling Stock Co. v. The R. Road,
34 Ohio St. 465, holds such transactions
voidable. If voidable, the right of the
stockholders to do so is not affected,
because individual directors and not the
whole board were interested. Nor will
the question depend on whether a sufficient number of directors not interested
ratified the contract: see Koehler v. The
Black River Fall Iron Co., 2 Black 720.
The question is not without serious diffiBut the
culties or embarrassments.
necessity appears imperative, that interested directors should withhold from
taking any part in the action or deliberations of a board in regard to a subject
in which they were personally interested
with the other contracting parties.
The view of the court is that the
directors of the Metropolitan had it in
their power to annul and modify the
lease so as to release the fanhattan
company from the payment of the
guarantied dividend of ten per cent.
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on the stock of the lessor cdmpany
without the assent of the stockholders,
and to substitute a new relation which
is best described as that of bailees to
run that road in the interest of the three
companies, without any interference by
the directors of the Metropolitan.
It is sustained on the ground that the
contract to pay a dividend on the stock
of the Metropolitan was with the corporation and not with the stockholders, and
that the directors, as the governing body,
were competent to vary the contract to
the extent of releasing the lessee company from the absolute contract to pay,
and to substitute a contingent dividend
to be earned out of the road operated
by the former lessees after appropriating
the joint receipts of the two roads, first
for the benefit of the stockholders of the
New York company.
This new arrangement should be described as a cancellation of the lease and
substitution of a new contract by which
the management of the Metropolitan
was delegated to the Manhattan, allowing the Metropolitan to participate with
the Manhattan in the eventual earnings
*of their own road.
Does such an exercise of discretion
necessarily arise from the fact that they
are the governing body of a corporation.
The powers of the board are as varied as
the subjects which they administer ; they
are implied powers growing out of the
relation of agency, and it is conceived
that no powers are implied under the law
of agency to authorize directors to change
the status of the company from that of a
leased road, with a guarantied dividend
to preserve which the board were elected
by the stockholders; to sich a radically
different relation as the present one discloses, in which the dividends became
dependent upon the contingency of their
being earned, through the management
of a third party selected by the directors
to manage the road instead of themselves.
And in this view the expressions of

Vice-Chancellor KINDEn SLnY, referred
to by Justice BsicxBuvsN in Taylor v.

The C'hidssterRailway Co., are pertinent.
"When you speak of ultra vires of the
company you mean one or other of two
things, either that you cannot bind all the
shareholders to submit to it, or it is ultra
vices in this respect, that the legislature
for instance having authorized you to
make a railway you cannot go and make
a harbor. But in the present case the
latter question does not arise. The question is whether it is ultra rices as being
beyond the power of the directors to
bind all the shareholders."
The conclusion does not necessarily
seem to follow that because under the
New York decisions, quoted in the opinion, the directors, and not the shareholders are the governing body of a
corporation, that the power of the directors extends to create such a changed
relation of the stockholders as in this
case.
And peculiarly so because the
agreement required each certificate issued
and reissued by the Ictropolitan, to
have the fact of the holder being entitled
to a guarantied dividend to be put on
the face of the certificate.
The rule which controls the exercise
of the power by the directors limit it to
the objects they were appointed to carry
out.
The stockholders, complainants,
had entered into a body, the fundamental idea of which is that they had acquired a right to a fixed dividend gnaranteed by a lessee who had assumed the
risks of the business, in consideration
of certain advantages accruing to the
lessees. The board of such a company
has by implication entirely distinct powers from the nature of the ease, from one
selected to conduct a company engaged
in transportation.
Their duties are to
protect the lessors, to see that the lessees
comply with their engagements, and to
enforce the rights of the lessors as to
the property leased.
Consideration might require the board
in their diseretion for the purpose of pro-
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tecting the rights of their constituents to
forego the payment of the instalments
of dividends, in certain events to agree
to a reduction or to foreclose, to re-enter
and possess themselves of the property,
and to resume their first business as carriers, if in their judgment the interests
of their constituents required it.
It is difficult to specify the limits
within which the courts will restrain
their powers in protecting the rights
of the lessors.
But is it certain that
those powers can be construed to enable them to destroy or set aside the
fundamental position of the association which they were the managers to
preserve, any more than the stockholders
could by the vote of a majority as
against a dissentient stockholder ? Black
v. Delaware 4- R. Canal Co., 24 N. J.

Eq. 455, in which case the lease of a railroad by legislative authority was held
such a radical change of the condition
of the company as to be void against a
single dissentient stockh.older.
The
change in this case was equally great.
Their powers in the present case are held
to extend to enable them to release the
payment of the dividend by the lessees
without re-entering and retaking the
leased estate, but leaving it in the hands
of the lessees to apply the net earnings
after the payment of taxes and covenanted interest on bonds as a joint fund
with that of the New York road, to the
payment of a cumulative dividend of
six per cent. to the New York road,
leaving only a resulting interest for the
Metropolitan in the business conducted
by the Manhattan.
AMoaTox P. HxRy.

iZew York Court of Appeals.
AUERBACH v. NEW YORK CENTRAL, &c., RAILROAD COMPANY..
Where it is expressed in terms upon a railway ticket that it is not good unless
'used" on or before a certain day, a presentation of the ticket and its
acceptance
by the conductor before midnight of that day, although the journey is not completed
until the next morning, will be held to be a compliance with the condition.
Where a railway ticket binds the passenger to a continuous journey, lie is not
bound to commence his journey at the starting point named in the ticket, but may
enter the train at any intermediate station on the route.
ACTION by a passenger to recover damages for being ejected from
defendant's cars. The material facts of the case are as follows:
The plaintiff being in St. Louis on the 21st of September 1877,
purchased of the Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company a ticket
for a passage from St. Louis, over the several railroads mentioned
in coupons annexed to the ticket, to the city of New York. It was
specified on the ticket that it was "good" for one continuous passage to point named "in coupon attached ;" that in selling the
ticket for passage over other roads, the company making the sale
acted only as agent for such other roads and assumed no responsibility beyond its own line ; that the holder of the ticket agreed

AL'ERBACH v. N. Y. CENTRAL, &c., RAILROAD CO.

with the respective companies over whose roads he was to be carried
to use the same on or before the 26th of September then instant, and
that if he failed to comply with such agreement, either of the companies might refuse to accept the ticket or any coupon thereof and
demand the full regular fare which he agreed to pay. He left St.
Louis on the day he bought the ticket, and rode to Cincinnati and
stopped there a day. He then rode to Cleveland and stayed there a
few hours, and then rode to Buffalo, reaching there on the 24th, and
stopped there a day. Before reaching Buffalo he had used all the
coupons except the one entitling him to a passage over the defendant's
road from Buffalo to New York. The material part of the language
upon that coupon is as follows: " Issued by the Ohio and Mississippi Railway on account of New York Central and Hudson
River Railroad one first-class passage, Buffalo to New York."
Being desirous of stopping at Rochester the plaintiff purchased
a ticket over the defendant's road from Buffalo to Rochester, and
upon that ticket rode to Rochester on the 25th, reaching there in
the afternoon. He remained there about a day, and in the afternoon of the 26th of September he entered one of the cars upon
the defendant's road to complet; the passage to the city of New
York. He presented his ticket with the one coupon attached to
the conductor, and it was accepted by him and was recognised as a
proper ticket, and punched several times until the plaintiff reached
Hudson, about three or four o'clock A. m., September 27th, when
the conductor in charge of the train declined to recognise the ticket,
on the ground that the time had run out, and demanded $3 fare to
the city of New York, which the plaintiff declined to pay. The
conductor with some force then ejected him from the car.
The trial judge nonsuited the plaintiff on the ground that the
ticket entitled him to a continuous passage from Buffalo to New
York, and not from any intermediate point to New York. The
general term affirmed the nonsuit upon the ground that although
the plaintiff commenced his passage upon the 26th of September
he could not continue it after that date, on that ticket.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
EARL, J.-We are of the opinion that the plaintiff was improperly nonsuited. The contract at St. Louis evidenced by the ticket
and coupons there sold was not a contract by any one company or
by all the companies named in the coupons jointly for a continuous
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passage from St. Louis to New York. A separate contract was
made for a continuous passage over each of the roads mentioned in
the several coupons. Each company, through the agents selling the
ticket, made a contract for a passage over its road, and each company assumed responsibility for the passenger only over. its road.
No company was liable for any accident or default upon 'any road
but its own. This was so by the very terms of the agreement
printed upon the ticket. Hence, the defendant is not in a position
to claim that the plaintiff was bound to a continuous passage from
St. Louis to New York, and it cannot complain of the stoppages
at Cincinnati and Cleveland. Hutchinson on Carriers, sect. 579;
Brooks v. The Bailway, 15 Mich. 332.
But the plaintiff was bound to , continuous passage over the
defendant's road-that is,the plaintiff could not enter one train of
the defendant's cars and then leave it, and subsequently take another
train and complete his journey. He was not, however, bound to
commence his passage at Buffalo. He could commence it at Rochester or Albany, or any other point between Buffalo and New York,
and there make it continuous. The language of the contract, and
the purpose which may be supposed to have influenced the making
of it do not require a construction which make itimperative upon
a passenger to enter a train at Buffalo. No possible harm or inconvenience could come to the defendant if the passenger should forego
his right to ride from Buffalo and ride only from Rochester or Albany.
The purpose was only to compel a continuous passage after the passenger had once entered upon a train. On the 26th of September
the plaintiff having the right to enter a train at Buffalo, it cannot
be perceived why he could not, with the same ticket, rightfully
enter a train upon the same line at any point nearer to the place
of destination.
When the plaintiff entered the train at Rochester on the afternoon of the 26th of September and presented his ticket and it was
accepted and punched, it was then used within the meaning of the
contract. It could then have been taken up. So far as the plaintiff was concerned it had then performed its office. It was thereafter left with him not for his convenience but under regulations
of the defendant fovits convenience that it might know that his
passage had been paid for. The contract did not specify that the
passage should be completed on or before the 26th, but that the
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ticket should be used on or before that day, and that it was so used
seems to us too clear for dispute.
The languoge printed upon the ticket must be- regarded as the
language of the defendant, and as it is of doubtful import the doubt
should not be solved to the detriment of the passenger. If it had
been intended by the defendant that the passage should be continuous
from St. Louis to New York, or that it should actually commence
at Buffalo and be continuous to the city of New York, or that the
passage should be completed on or before the 26th of September,
such intention should have been plainly expressed and not left in
doubt as might, and naturally would, mislead the passenger.
We have carefully examined the authorities to which the learned
counsel for the defendant has called our attention, and it is sufficient to soy that none of them are in conflict with the views above
expressed.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs
to abide the event.
1. At about the same time that the
principal cawv was dec-ided a case of a

similar nature wos decided, anl in the
'awe way, in the St." Louis Court of
Appealk.

The ca-c was that of Ervma

v. St. Lovi, 5"c., Raiload Co., and is
iitc( in the Central Law Journal of
June 23d 1882. So far as we have
been able to discover, the point in issue
had not previonly been raised, and it is
somewhat curious that it should have been
pa-seid upon by these two court. at the
-awe time. These decisions will no doubt
he regarded as settling the question, and
establishing the proposition that a railway ticket on which is printed a stipulation that it is not good unless used on
or before a certain day, is good for the
journey contracted for if presented before midnight of the day on which it
expires, although the journey is not complete until the next day or days.
2. That a railroad company has the

right to limit the period within whi h
a ticket issued by it will be recognised
is a proposition not considered in the
principal case, but assumed and passed
without comment. And for that matter
VOL. XXX.- 100

comment was wholly unnecessary.

Tbh?

truth of the proposition is now evervwhere conceded, being well established
Rie.,
ailby the outhorities : Boston,
road Co. v. Proctor, 1 Allen 267;
Cmecldll v. Tie C. 4.A. Rae;rad Co.,
67 Ill.390; State v. Ca'plJiel, 32 N.
J. Law 309; Shedd v. T,'oy, 6-e., Railroad Co., 40 Vt. 88; Jolinson v. Concord Rdload Co., 46 N. H. 213.
3. In Pier v. "7n4h, 24 Barb. 514,
the Supreme Court of New York passed
on the following ticket: "New York
& Erie Railroad. Corning to Elmira.
Please keep this in sight. Good this
1854."
The
trip only. Oct. 19th
holder of the ticket did not take passage until December 25th following, when
he was forcibly put off the train, the.conductor refusing to receive the ticket
because it was dated several days preriously
It was contended that the
ticket was limited to a ride in the next
passenger train going from Corning to
Elmira after the purchase of the ticket,
or at all events that the right was limited
to the day on which the ticket bore date.
The court said : " The words which arc
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supposed to limit the undertaking to
some specific train of cars or period of
time, and the only words which are
claimed to have that effect are 'good
this trip only.'
It is quite apparent, I
think, that these words have no reference to any particular day or hour whatever. They do not relate to time, but
to a journey. 'This trip.' What trip?
A trip, in its ordinary signification,
means a journey, jaunt or excursion by
some person; and as the ticket is given
to the passenger as evidence of his right,
'this trip' must be construed to mean
the journey such passenger proposes to
make, and does not become operative
until he undertakes it."
Where the ticket is stamped "Good
for this train only," and dated, the
right is limited to a passage on the company's cars on the day of its date:
Boice v. Hudson Rive Railroad Co., 61
Barb. 611 ; Elmore v. Sands, 54 N. Y.
512. In Gale T. Delaware, 6-c., Railroad Co., 7 Hun 670, it is held that a
ticket "good for this day and train
only," and dated onthe day of its issue,
authorizes a passenger to select any train
on that day. but not to stop over and
perform the residue of his journey on
another train.
Where a coupon is stamped "not
good if detached" from stub, it confers
no right of passage on the holder after it
has been detached in violation of the
condition : Walker v. Railroad Co., 33
How. Pr. 327; Houston, 4-c., Railroad
Co. v. Ford, 53 Tex. 364; Hamilton
v. I. Y. Central Railroad Co., 51 N.
Y. 101.
4. It is well settled that where it is
necessary for a traveller in going from
one place to another to pass over connecting lines of railroad, it is competent
for either company to contract with him
for his transportation the whole distance. But a difference of opinion has
existed as to whether such a contract is
to be implied from the collection, by the
carrier, of fare in advance for the entire

journey, without any agreement limiting its risk to its own line. It has been
hel. that such a contract will be implied
under such circumstances : Railroad Co.
v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 647; Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Copeland, 24
Ill. 332. And on the other hand it has
been held that such a contract will not
be implied from those circumstances:
Milnor v. N~ew York, 6-c., Railroad Co.,
53 N. Y. 363 ; Kniqht v. P. 6- S., 6-c.
Railroad Co., 56 le. 234; Hartan v.
Eastern Railroad Co., 114 Mass. 44.
5. It must be regarded as settled that
where a railway ticket is sold specifying
that it is good for "one first-class passage" from one place to another named
thereon, the contract is an entirety and
cannot be performed in parts. The contract is for a continuous passage. As
expressed by Mr. Chief Justice GREEN
of New Jersey, in a case decided in that
state in 1854, the passenger by such a
ticket "' acquires the right to be carried
directly from one point to the other
without interruption. He acquired no
right to be transported from one point
to another upon the route, at different
times and by different lines of conveyance, until the entire journey was
accomplished. The company engaged
to carry the passenger over the entire
route for a stipulated price. But it was
no part of their contract that they would
suffer him to leave the train and to resume his seat in another train at any
intervening point
upon the road :
State v. Overton, 24 N. J. Law 438.
And see Stone v. The C. 6 NY. IV. Railrbad Co., 47 Iowa 82; Drew v. Central
Pacific Railroad Co., 51 Cal. 425 ; McClure v. Philadelphia, 6-c., RailroadCo.,
34 Aid. 532, 536 ; Hamilton v. NV. Y.
C. Railroad Co., 51 N. Y. 100 ; Cheney
v. Boston, 6-c., Railroad Co., 11 Miet.
122; Cleveland, 6-c., Railroad Co. v.
Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457 ; Barker v.
Coffin, 31 Barb. 556 ; Terry v. flushing, 4-c., Railroad Co., 13 Hun (N. Y.)
360; Oil Creek, 6-e., Railroad Co. v.
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Clark, 72 Penn. St. 231; Onterbridye
V. PhiladdPlda, 6-c., Rdilroad Co., 1
Wckly Notes (Phila.) 11. And so in
Didridt v. P nasyleaar Railroad Co.,
71 Penn. St. 435, where the ticket was
issued " March l1th 1867," and was
stamped "good only until March 16th
1867."
That the passenger purchasing
such through ticket has been permitted
to ride on subscquent trairs without a
stop-over check is inadmissible evidence,
in an action brought by him against the
company for ejecting him, and not allowing him to ride on a subsequent train
without a stop-over check : Stone v.
Cldcygo Railiod Co., 47 Iowa 82.
The contract between the carrier and
the passenger is reciprocal. As the passenger con insist on a continuous passage, having once taken passage on a
train that stops at the station specified
on the ticket, so the company can insist
on a continuous passage, and the passenger cannot demand of the conductor
as matter of right, a lay-over ticket:
ch,,'clYll v. hiceqo, sc., Railroad Co.,
67 Ill. 393. But where a pa~sengcr,
upon applying to a conductor for infornation is told by him that he may
.et off at an intermediate station, and
continue his journey by the next train
upon the same ticket, and the passenger
relying on such statement leaves the
train and takes passage on the next
train, the company is bound to ea-ry
him on the next train to the end of his
route, and is estopped from denying the
authority of the conductor to make the
agreement: Tarbell v. Northern Central
In
Railroad Co., 24 Hun (N. Y.) 51.
a ease in New Jersey, however, where
the plaintiff, riding in the cars by virtue
of a through ticket, stopped at an intermediate point, and having entered another train, claimed the right to continue
his journey on the same ticket by virtue
of the representations made by the conductor, but was expelled from the train,
it was held that he could not recover, it
appearing that only a train agent could

modify the force of the ticket: Petrie v.
Peesyh'ania Rail-oad Co., 42 N. J.
Law 449.
Where a passenger gave to the con
ductor his ticket from C. to N., but the
conductor gave him no check in return,
and before reaching N. there was a
change of conductors, and the new conductor expelled the passenger for want
of a ticket, the company was held liable
Jlroad
Raic.,
in damages: Pitsnt,'gh,
Co. v. Hennigh, 39 Ind. 509.
6. Where a railroad company operates
two roads between two points on its
through route, one being a part of its
through route, and the other a longer
route used for way trains, it is held that
a passenger purchasing a through ticket
is only entitled to travel over the
For
through and most direct route.
instance one purchasing a ticket at
Buffalo for Albany over the New York
Central Railroad, could not leave the
train at Rochester, and go around by
way of Auburn, connecting with the
main line at Syracuse: Bcnnett v.1N. Y.
(',dtral, &c., Railroad Co., 69 N. Y.
594.
7. A ticket issued for d passage from
one specified place to another, does not
entitle the holder to a passage in a direction the reverse of that indicated on the
ticket. For instance a ticket issued for
a passage from Portland to Boston is
not good for a passage from Boston to
Portland; Keeley v. Becton, 6-c., Railroad Co., 67 Me. 163 (1878).
8. The law imposes no obligation on
a railroad company to carry passengers
on frieght trains, nor freight on passenger trains. It only requires them to
carry both, permitting them to regulate
the manner in which it shall be done:
Araold v. RIl. Cent. Railroad Co., 83
I11. 273; Chicago, 4e., Railroad Co. v.
Randolph, 53 Id. 515. So that when a
passenger purchases a ticket he only
acquires the right to be carried according to the custom of the road; he
acquires the right to be carried to the
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place for which it calls, on any train
that usually carries passengers to that
place. He cannot insist on going on a
freight train, nor on a through train not
accustomed to stop at that station:
Chicago, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Randolph,

siupra. So the words "good on passenger trains only," printed on a ticket
do not amount to an agreement that all
of the passenger trains of the company
will stop at the station designated on
the ticket. Hence, in an action broueht
against the company to recover damages
for carrying the holder of the ticket past
the destination named on such ticket, the
complaint should aver that the train on
which lie was so carried was one which,
tnder the regulations of the company,
should have stopped at that station : Ohio,
6-c., Railroad Co. v. Swarthoit, 67 Ind.
567 ; Ohio, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Hatton,
60 Id. 12.
9. The rule sometimes adopted, requiring passengers who pay on the train
to pay a higher rate of fare than those
who pay at the ticket office, is a lawful
regulation, provided such higher rate is
a reasonable one: State v. Goold, 53
Ale. 279 ; Ritter v. Philadelphia, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 2 Weekly Notes Cases
382; Chicago, 6-c., Railroad Co. v.
Parks, 18 Il.460 ; Pllman Palace Car
Co. v. Reed, 75 Id. 130 ; Indianapolis,
4-c., Railroad Co. v. Rinard, 46 Ind.
293; Hoqffbauer v. The D., 4-c., Railroad Co., 52 Iowa 342 ; Toledo, 4-c.,
Railroad Co. v. Wright, 68 Ind. 586 ;
.Jeffcrsonville, 6-c., Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 28 Id. I ; State v. C6horin, 7 Iowa
204; Du Laurehs v. First Dhri.i., i4c.,
15 Minn. 49 ; Bland v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co., 55 Cal. 570. Where a
railroad company requires that tickets
shall be purchased at the railway station,
it must furnish convenient facilities to
the public for the purchase of tickets by
keeping open the office a reasonable time
in advance of the hour fixed by the timetables for the departure of trains. If
this is not done, a party has the right to

enter the train and offer to pay for the
passage, and if this is refused and lie is
ejected, he has a right of action against
the company : Chirago, 6-c., Railroad
Co. v. Flayg, 43 Ill. 364 ; Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 67 Id. 314 ;
17linois Centra Railroad Co. v. Sutton,
42 Id. 440 ; Chicago, 4-c., Railroad Co.
v. Parks,supra; St. Lovi3, 4-c., Railroad
Co. v. Dalby, 19 Id. 353 ; Jeffersonrile,
6-c.. Railroad Co. v. Rogers, supra;
Paine v. Chicago, 6-c., Railroad Co., 45
Iowa 569. No right exists to eject a
passenger who has paid the regular rate
and refused to pay the extra fare, so long
as the money is retained in the possession
of the conductor. So long as the conductor keeps the money it is evidence that
it was received as full fare, and the passenger may rely on it as such. The company is liable if the passenger is expelled
before the money is returned, and it is
no defence that the conductor returned
the money after he had got the passenger
off the train: Bland v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co., 55 Cal. 570. But it is not
the duty of the company to keep the office
open as long as a delayed train may happen to stop at the station after the time
established for its departure. It is held
sufficient if it is kept open during such a
reasonable time before the time appointed
for the train to start, as that all passengers who arrive at the depot on time
shall have a sufficient time to purchase a
ticket and get aboard the train : St. Louis,
4-c., Railroad Co. v. South, 43 fI1. '76.
In New York the Supreme Court has
held that where a railroad company is
authorized by law to charge additional
fare to a passenger who omits to purchase
a ticket before entering the cars, it is not
bound to keep its ticket office open for
any particular time before the departure
of the train, in the absence of a statutory provision requiring it to do so:
Bordeaux v. Erie Railroad Co., 8 Hun
579. And where the company requires
extra fares of passengers not purchasing
tickets before entering the cars, and the
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pa -'engcr pays the extra rate for a passage from A. to B., and on reaching B.
does not leave the train but concludes to
go on to C., he is again bound to pay the
additional rate the same as though he entered the train at B. : Uicago, 6-c.,
Railroad Co. v. Park,, syfpra.
A railroad company has the right to
adopt a rule requiring all persons, who
propose taking passage on a freight train,
to purchase their tickets before entering
the cars, and authorizing the conductors
to expel from the train all persons who
have not provided themselves with tickets: Lat v. Illinois Central Railroad
Tenm.,
Co., 32 Iowa 534 ; Lane v. Fa.,t
kc., Railead Co., 5 Lea (Tenn.) 124;
c.2 Am. & Eng. Railway Cases 278;
Ill1bwois Ctral Railroad Co. v. Nelson,
59 Il.110; Toledo, 6-e., Railroad Co.
v. Patieosn, 63 Id. 304 ; Lake Shore,
6"e.,
Railroad Co. v. Grencood, 79
Penn. St. 373; B. 6- M. Railroad Co.
v. Rose, I1 Neb. 177. But the cases
hold that the public is entitled to previous notice of such a regulation.
10. It is of course within the legitiniate power of a state to enact that a
railway ticket shall be good for a certain
period from the time it is issued,
-pecificd
and that the holder of the ticket shall
have the right to stop over at any of the
stations along the line of the road. But
such a statute is limited to and cannot
outside the limits of the
have any effect
state enacting it.' For instance, in 1871
the legiature of Maine enacted that the
holder of a railway ticket should have
the right to stop over at any station along
the line. After the passage of this law
a ticket was purchased in Portland,
Asine, for a passage from that point to
Montreal, Canada, and was stamped
"Good only for a continuous trip within
two days from date," being dated on
Mlareh 3d. The holder stopped over and
did not reach the Canadian line until the
last of March. The conductor then refited to allow him to ride further, and
put him from the train. The passenger

contended that the ticket having been
purchased in Maine, the contract for carriage was a Maine contract and subject
to the statute already alluded to. The
court held that no extra territorial effect
could be given to the statute, that to
give it effect beyond the state limits would
be to give force to a regulation of interstate commerce: Carpenter v. Grand
Trunk Railroad Co., 72 Me. 388.
11. It is settled that the state can regulate the fares which railway companies
can charge for transportation of freight
or passengers: Illinois Cent,-al Railroad
Co. v. Pople, 95 I11. 313 ; Ruggles v.
Rail
P.,
Pople, 91 Id. 256 ; hinona,
road Co. v. Blake, 94 U. S. 180 ; S. C.

19 Iinn. 418; Shitds v. 0hio, 95 U. S.
RailroadCo. v. Iowa,
319 ; Gie-ago,
94 Id. 155.

12. Where a railroad ticket purports
on its face to be for the exclusive use of
a man and his family, a son who is residing with the father, as a member of
his family, is authorized to ride on the
road by virtue such of ticket, notwithstanding he may be over twenty-one years
of age. But if at the time the ticket
was purchased, the purchaser was informed that a son over twenty-one years
old would not be permitted to ride on it
under the regulations of the company,
such a regulation forms a part of the contract of purchase and is obligatory upon
the holder or any person who attempts
to ride thereon : Chicago, 6-c., Railroad
Co. v. Clholln, 79 111. 584.
13. It has been held that a passenger
who exhibits his ticket and demands a
seat need not surrender the ticket until
a seat has been furnished. But when he
has been furnished with a seat, he cannot
refuse to surrender the ticket and offer
to pay from the point where the seat was
furnished: Davis v. Kansas Ctt, c.,
Railroad Co., 53 Mo. 317.
14. That a conductor has no right to
take tip a passenger's ticket, until the
last intermediate stopping place has been
passed, unless he puts the passenger in
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as good condition as lie was in before,
ticket stipulates that it is good for a
by giving him a check or token evidenc- certain period, but that if
presented
ing his rights, is asserted and with good after that time the conductor shall take
.reason: Palmer v. Charlotte Railroad it up and demand fare, the use of the
Co., 3 S. C. (N. S.) 580.
ticket a number of times in violation of
In Chicago, 6-c., Railroad Co. v. Grif- this condition does not estop the comfin, 68 Ii. 503, the court declare that pany from taking up the ticket and
"there is great force in the reasoning of
ejecting the passenger: Sherman v. Chisome of the cases that hold a passenger cago, 4-c., Railroad Co., supra.
would not be bound to surrender his
17. Where a passenger purchases an
ticket before passing all intermediate excursion ticket, not receivable on a
stations, without receiving a check in parti;ular train, and gets on board such
return." But the court held that the law train, lie may be compelled to pay full
did not impose the obligation of deliver- fare or be expelled from the cars : Nolan
ing a check where the passenger did not v. I. Y., 6-c., Railroad Co., 9 J, & Sp.
demand it from the conductor. A pas- 541.
senger is bound to surrender his ticket
18. And a company is under no obliwhen demanded by the conductor, in gation to transport a person who has purexchange for a conductor's check : North- chased a ticket with counterfeit money,
ern Railroad Co. v. Page, 22 Barb. (N.
and such person may be ejected if the
Y.) 130.
mistake is not rectified : Memplhis Rail15. Where a commutation ticket stip- road v. Chastine, 54 Miss. 503.
ulated that it should only be used by the
19. Where a railroad company inperson to whom it was issued, and that structed its gateman to compel passeni found in the hands of any other person gers to produce their tickets on leaving
it should be forfeited and taken up, it its station, and tie plaintiff was stopped
was held that the ticket could be properly by the gateman while attempting to pass
taken from the person to whom it was out of the station, who demanded his
issued, if it had been used by any other ticket, and also detained him, although
person with his connivance, that it could informed lie had lost his ticket, and
be taken up even in the hands of the per- who finally sent for a policeman, who
son to whom it was issued: Freddenrichv. arrested him for disorderly conduct and
Baltimore, 6-c., Railroad Co., 53 Ald. for refusing to pay his fare, who took
201.
him to the station house and detained
A railroad company can require com- him over night, it was held that the
muters to show their tickets, and in de- company was liable for false imprisonfault can exact fare without any liability ment, the plaintiff having been disto repay the same: Bennett v. Railroad charged the next morning on his examiCo., 7 Phil. 11 ; Cresson v. Philadelphia, nation before a police justice : Lynch v.
S-c., Railroad Co., 32 Leg. Int. 363.
Metropolitan Elevated Railway Co., 24
16. A thousand-mile ticket, which Hun 506.
contained a stipulation " good for six
20. And it seems that where a ticket
months only," has been held void at is sold to A. for a "continuous passage"
the end of that time, although the thou- from one point to another, and A. sells
sand miles may not have all been trav- such ticket at an intermediate station to
elled: Lillis v. St. Louis, 4-c., Rail- B., B. acquires no right to continue the
road Co., 64 Mo. 464; Powell v. Pitts- journey from such intermediate station
burgh, 6-c., Railroad Co., 25 Ohio St. and on the same train: Cody v. Central
70; Sherman v. Chicago, 6-c., Railroad Pacific Railroad Co., 4 Sawyer 114,
'o., 40 Iowa 45. And when such 118.
HENRY "WADE ROGERS.
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The seizure and actual removal of specific chattels of a partnership, on an
execution igainst one member thereof for his private debt, and the exclusion of the
firm from the possession of such property, constitute a trespass for which the firm
maiy maintain an action against the officer.

ACTION of trespass for entering the plaintiffs' premises and taking
and conveying away certain articles of personal property belonging to the plaintiffs. The defendant, a constable, justified on the
ground that he attached said property upon a writ in favor of one
Rich and another against Packard, one of the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs were copartners in business, and the dfeudgnt knew of
the fact at the time of the attachment. The court below ruled that
upon the facts the plaintiffs were entitled to nominal damages at
1za- t. The defendant excepted.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALLEN, J.-The question presented in this case has been several
times alluded to, but has never been decided in Massachusetts,
though it has been the subject of much discussion and conflicting
opinion elsewhere. It has been declared that the real and actual
interest of each partner in the partnership stock is the net balance
which will be coming to him after payment of all the partnership
debts, and a just settlement of the account between himself and
his partner: -Peek v. F1~isher, 7 Cush. 389. This doctrine is in
accordance with the great body of modern decisions.
It is also declared, in Allen v. Wells, 22 Pick. 452, that a separate creditor can take and sell only the interest of the debtor in
the partnership property, being his share upon a division of the
surplus, after discharging all demands upon the copartnership.
This rule also is supported by a great weight of authority.
It is rather remarkable, in view of the multitude of cases in
which the question has arisen, and the conflict of opinion which
has existed, that the manner in which a creditor of one member
of a firm may apply that member's interest in the partnership to
the payment of his debt has not been more often the subject of
legislation, The rights of parties, however, in this State, as in
almost all the other States of the Union, are still left to be worked
out as well as possible by the courts.
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There is an entire concurrence of opinion among the leading
text-writers, in recent times, that courts of law cannot adequately
deal with the subject: 3 Kent Com. 65, n. ; Story on Part., §§ 262,
312: Collyer on Part., § 830. Lindley sums up what he has to
say with the remark : "The truth is that the whole of this branch
of the law is in a most unsatisfactory condition, and requires to be
Put on an entirely new footing -" Lindley on Part. (4th ed.) 694.
It is sufficient for the purposes of the present case to decide, as
we do, that the seizure and actual removal of specific chattels of a
partnership, on a writ of execution against one member thereof for
his private debt, and the exclusion of the firm from the possession
of its property, are trespass. The authorities in support of this
proposition seem -to us more in accordance with just legal principles than those which are opposed to it: Bank v. Carrolton
Railroad, 11 Wall. 628, 629 ; Cropper v. (0oburn,2 Curtis C. C.
465; Burnell v. Hunt, 5 Jur. 650, by PATTESON, J. ; Garvin v.
Paul, 47 N. 11. 158; .Duborrow's Ap.peal, 84 Penn. St. 404;
ffaynes v. Knowles, 36 Mich. 407 ; Levy v. Cowan, 27 La. An.
556.
Exceptions overruled.
Sir Nathaniel Lindley, in his -¢aluable work on the Law of Partnership
(p. *515), thus states the manner of issuing and levying an excution against a
partnership for a firm debt: "If a judgment has been obtained against several
persons sued jointly, the writ of execution founded on the judgment must be
against all of them, and not against some
or one of them only ; for the judgment
does not warrant such a writ. But, although the writ of execution on a joint
judgment must be joint in form, it may
be levied upon all or any one or more of
the persons named in it ; for each is liable to the judgment-creditor for the
whole, and not for a proportionate part
of the sum for which judgment is obtained. The consequence of this is that
the sheriff may execute a writ issued
against several partners jointly, either on
their joint property, or on the separate
property of any one or more of them, or
both on their joint and on their respective separate properties : and so long as

tlere is, within the sheriff's bailiwick, any
property of the partners, or any of them,
a return of nulla bona is improper. Of
course, if the judgment-creditor has had
execution and satisfac',on against one of
the partners, he cannot afterwards go
against any of the others ; but the important point to observe is, that the sheriff is not bound to levy on the goods of
the firm before having recourse to the
seperate properties of its members, and
that they cannot require the sheriff to
execute the writ in one way rather than
another.
As to the mode in which an execution
against one member of a firm for his in
dividual debt should be levied, there is
more difficulty. It may, of course, be
levied upon his individual property in
the same manner as if he were not a
member of a firm. The difficulty arises
when its collection is attempted from the
interest of the execution debtor in the
partnership property.
Ttere can be no question but that the
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nature of the share of a partner is correctly described in the principal case.
"What is meant by the share of a partnhr is his proportion of the partnership
a-ets after they have been all realized
and converted into money, and all the
debt, and liabilities have been paid and
di-ehareed :" Lindluv on Partnership
"*661 Meok v. 31otleod, 5 Ind. 404
• w'l, v. Bean,
x
37 Id. 526 ; Curler v.
Brvdlhy, 58 Il. 101 ; Shnpjon v. Luech,
86 Id. 286 ; lill v. &3cl;, 12 N. J. Eil.
31 ; Doa qla v. lViawduw, 20 Me. 89 ;
Pr,,? v. !M1lowvn, 6 La. Ann. 265;
Slrd, I. v. Itrion, 6 Minn. 265 ; FYiley
v. P,.?p, , 18 Conn. 294 : lfe,.ki v. lrbitzrY!, 52 N. Y. 146 ; 9t/f v. Betea', 73
Id. 264 ; 1, re Crbet, 5 Saw. 206 ;
I1141 v. Claq It, 48 Md. 223 : C(odnrlq v.
lM,;ugfoa U(Tvecrsctg, 2 Md. Ch. 497.
The interest of one partner in the
partnership property may be attached or
levied upon and sold on execution for his
separate debt : Sitle, v. 1Vleker, I Freem.
Ch. (Mi'a.) 77 ; PFce v. ,S'vedzer, 16
Ohio 142 ; Nixon v. Nasrh, 12 Ohio St.
647; J.amrs v. Stwta, 2 111. 203; tN7n,hull v. Bl;ekngha
an. 14 Id. 405 ; 1W/ite
v. Jone(s, 3S Id. 159 ; boa, v. Sa!nea,'d,
14 N7. H. 9 ; s. c. 12 Id. 271 ; Airarson
v. Lh rr, 21 La. Ann. 518 ;C/oppin
v. l17koa, 27 Id. 444; Sa,,ders v.
Bo,tjtt, 12 Heisk. 316 ; 'json
Il
V. Strola h, 59 Ala. 488 ; I1'._acerv. Atcroft,
50 Tex. 428; Rople' Bad v. Slryocl,
48 Md. 427, But a creditor of an individul partner has a right to sell on execution only that partner's interest in the
firm property, that is, what of the partnership property belonus to the debtor
partner, after paying the debts due by
the firm and his own debt to the firm:
Lindley on Partnership * 6 8 9 ; Merrill
v. BPitrrkr, I Bald. 528 ; Lyadon v. GoIaM, I Gall. 367; lV17ite v. Donqlrerty,
Mart. & Yerg. 309 ; M early v. Ealen,
2 Yeates 190 ; Knox v. Snnaers, 4 Id.
477 ; Knox v. Scepler, 2 Hill (S. C.)
595 Toppan v. Bloisdell, 5 N. H. 190;
6i'son v. Stecens, 7 Id. 352 ; Pierce v.
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Jackson, 6 Mass. 242 ; Ri. v. HeMrrk
6 II. 271 ; Nixon v.
ts, 12 Ohio St.
647 ; PRace v. Sunaetzer, 16 Ohio 142
Beoester v. Hawnmnt, 4 Conn. 540
117tter v. Ricdards, 10 Id. 37 ; 1Filly V.
Phelps, 18 Id. 294 ; .Joa- v. Ton.imoa,
12 Cal. 191 ; Meanqir v. lritwell, 52
N. Y. 146 ; Willias v. Gge, 49 Mi-s.
777 ; IltaCh, v. Johnson, 66 Me. 21. It
is not, according to the better opinion, an
interest in any particular pie(.e of property that is liable for a pzn'tner's separate debtt, but his intere-t in the firm
assets after the settlement of the firm
acounts. See Atwood v. 1f, redith, 37
Miss. 635, and the cases cited above.
No specific asset, credit or property of
the partnership is, according to the better opinion, liable to seizure under attaehlienr execution or garnishee process
against one of the partners: Lgny v.
C'owm,, 27 La. Ann. 556 ; Marston v.
Dawrerry, 21 Id. 518 ; Toa'ne v. Leoch,
32 Vt. 747 ; Peoples' Bank v. Shryqock,
48 Md. 427 ; Lpridon v. Gorrain, I Gall.
367 : Bdl/inel v. Wt'ilch12baeh, 3 Allen
161 ; Se
v. Read, 12 R. I. 121 ; (ok
v. Arthur, 11 Ired. 407 ; Clagtt v.
KiTbonrae, 1 Black 346 ; Gibson v. Stevens, 7 N. H. 352, Fis; v. Horeick, 6
Mass. 271 ; Ato'ood v. J]Ir,d;fh, 37
Miss. 635; Garvin v. Pw'l, 47 N. H.
158. In Maine, however, it has been
held that the debtor of a firm can be
held as trustee of one of the partners, in
an action in which that partner is principal defendant, if neither a creditor of
the firm nor any other partner interpose:
Thiormpson v. Le is, 34 Me. 167. It has
also been held in that state that a creditor of one of the partners may attach
such partner's interest in a specific portion of a stock of goods belonging to the
firm, and is not required in order to render the attachment regular to take the
partner's interest in the entire stock ot
goods: Fogg v. Lawvry, 68 'Me. 78. See
also Carillon v. Thomas, 6 Mo. App.
574. See, however, Hacor v. Johnson,
66 Me. 21.
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If the sheriff sells and delivers not the
share of the execution debtor, but the
goods themselves, lie is, according to
some authorities, not liable in trover, but
is accountable to the solvent partners for
so much of the proceeds of the sale as is
proportioned to their share in the partnership: Lind. on Part. *690; Mayhew
v. lleric, 7 0. B. 229 ; White v.
Woodward, 8 B. Mlon. 484. According
to other authorities, however, and as it
seems, according to the better opinion, a
sheriff cannot, upon a demand against
one partner for his private debt, seize the
goods of the partnership and exclude the
other partners from the possession ; and
if lie does, lie is guilty of a trespass and
is liable in trover to another partner;
and the plaintiff in such case, it is held,
is entitled to recover his undivided share
in the property sold, without regard to
the state of the partnership accounts.
See Walsh v. Adams, 3 Den. 125 ; Spalding v. Black, 22 Kans. 55 ; Atkins v.

Saxton, 77 N. Y. 195. See, also, cases
cited by the court in the principal case.
As to how an execution against one
partner for his individual debt should be
levied upon his share in the firm, Lindley, in his work on Part. *689, after stating the former practice, says that "it
was finally settled, in conformity with
the older cases, that the sheriff's duty
was, and it still is, to seize the whole of
the partnership effects, or if so much of
them as may be requisite, and to sell the
undivided share of the debtor partner
therein, without reference to the state of
the accounts as between him and his copartners. Tle sheriff, having seized tile
property of the firm, proceeds to sell cie
interest of the judgment debtor, and to
assign the same to the purchaser. The
bill of sale recites that the sheriff has entered upon, and taken possession of, all
the share and interest of A. B. (the
judgment debtor) as partner with one
C. D., of and in all the book debts,
materials, tools, implements, goods, chattels, effects and stock-in trade used in

the said business, which has been valued
at -1 ; and the sheriff then assigns all
the share, right and interest of him, the
said A. B., of and in all and every the
debts, chattels and effects so seized under
and by virtue of the writ of fi.fa., and
held by the said A. B. in partnership or
joint-tenancy with the said C. D., to
have and to hold, receive and take, the
said share, furniture, debts, goods, chattels and effects therebybargained and sold,
or intended so to be, unto the said F. F.
(tile purchaser), his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, as his and their
own proper debts, goods and chattels."
The purchaser at the sale under an execution against one partner of his interest
in the partnership property, does not acquire any title to the property, entitling
him to a delivery of it, nor if it be a
debt entitling him to collect it. The
title to the property or the debt still remains in the firm, and the purchaser
acquires only a right to an account :
Lind. on Part. "690; Banrett v. Ml1cKenzie, 24 Minn. 20; Lathrop v. Wightman, 41 Penn. St. 297 ; Deal v. Bogue,
20 Id. 228; fleinheimer v. Hningway,
35 Id. 432 ; Snith v. Emerson, 43 Id.
456 ; Wilson v. Strobach, 59 Ala. 488;
Sitter v. Walker, I Freem. Ch. (Miss.)
77 ; Andrews v. Keith, 34 Ala. 722. See,
however, Atkins v. Saxton, 77 N. Y.
195, per RAPAIJO, J.
A suit in equity
is, therefore, necessary in order that the
partnership accounts may be taken, and
the partnership property duly applied;
Lind. on Part. *690. The bill for an
account may be filed after the seizure
and before the sale, or the sale may be
made and the purchaser left to file a bill

to ascertain his interest: Broadnax v.
lTiomason, I La. Ann. 383: lWixon v.
.\Iash, 12 Ohio St. 647. See also Knight
v. Ogden, 2 Tenn. Ch. 473. The judgment debtor may, as it seems, elect to
have the account taken before the sale by
applying to a court of equity therefor:
Hacker v. Johnson, 66 le, 21, 25.
As to the decision-in the principal
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case, it will be apparent, we think, from
an examinatian of the authorities cited
by the court and those in this note, that

it is correct both upon principle and
authority.
I. D. EWELL.
Chicago.

Snprenze @'owrt of Arkansas.
STATE v. GRIGSBY

ET UX.

Parents are intrusted with the custody of their children on the presumption that
the latter will be properly taken care of, and when it is found that the parents are
guilty of gross neglect, cruelty or conduct injurious to the morals or interests of
the children a court of chancery will interfere and appoint a suitable guardian.
This jurisdiction of the courts of chancery is not taken away by a like power
contbrred by statute on the probate courts.
The botter practice is to bring the bill in the name of the infant by its next friend,

but such bill ought not to be dismissed because brought in the name of the state.
APPEAL from Scott Circuit Court in Chancery.

This was a bill in equity in the name of the State against James
Grigsby and Emma, his wife, alleging in substance that the defendant James, b.eing the father of a child now about six years of age,
intermarried with the defendant Emma : that defendants were able
to properly provide for the child but that the defendant Emma,
with the consent of the defendant James, subjected it to cruel and
inhuman treatment, inflicting excessive chastisement, depriving it
of food and drink, and in various ways, specifically set forth in the
bill, torturing it to such an extent as to endanger its life ; that
several persons had offered to give it a comfortable home but that
defendants refused to allow them to do so. The bill prayed that
a guardian might be appointed, and that pending the suit defendants
might be compelled to deliver the child to some suitable person.
The court below appointed a custodian of the child and enjoined
defendants from interference with his possession. At the next
term defendant demurred to the bill on the grounds, 1st, of defect
of parties : 2d, of want of jurisdiction, and, 3d, that the statements
of the bill were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The
court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill. Plaintiff
appealed.
£'endenning & ,S'andels, for the State.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ENGLISH, C. J.-The jurisdiction of the court of chancery
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extends to the care of the person of the infant, so far as necessary
for his protection and education, and as to the care of the property
of the infant, for its due management and preservation and proper
application for his maintenance. It is upon the former ground,
principally, that is to say, for the due protection and education of
the infant, that the court interferes with the ordinary rights of parents, as guardians by nature, or by nurture, in regard to the
custody and care of their children. For, although, in general,
parents are intrusted with the custody of the persons, and the
education of their children, yet this is done upon the natural presumption that the children will be properly taken care of, and will
be brought up with a due education in literature, morals and
religion, ,nd that they will be treated with kindness and affection.
But whenever this presumption is removed: whenever (for example)
it is found that a father is guilty of gross ill-treatment or cruelty
towards his infant children, or that he is in constant habits of
drunkenness and blasphemy, or low and gross debauchery, or that
he professes atheistical or irreligious principles, or that his domestic
associations are such as tend to the corruption and contamination
of his children, or that he otherwise acts in a manner injurious to
the morals or interests of his children-in every such case, the
court of chancery will interfere, and deprive him of the custody of
his children, and appoint a suitable person to act as guardian, and
to take care of them and superintend their education. But it
is only in cases of gross misconduct that parents' rights are interfered with : 2 Story's Eq. Juris., 20th ed., sect. 1341.
The jurisdiction thus asserted, to remove infant children from
the custody of their parents, and to superintend their education
and maintenance, is admitted to be of extreme delicacy, and of no
inconsiderable embarrassment and responsibility. But it is nevertheless a jurisdiction which seems indispensable to the sound morals,
the good order, and the just protection of a civilized society: On
a recent occasion, after it had been acted upon for one hundred and
fifty years, it was attempted to be brought into question, and was
resisted, as unfounded in the true principles of English jurisprudence. It was, however, confirmed by the House of Lords, with
entire unanimity, and on that occasion was sustained by a weight
of authority and reasoning rarely equalled: Id., sect. 1342, and
note.'
The jurisdiction of chancery to appoint a guardian, and if neces-
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sary for that purpose, to interfere between a father and his children,
is undoubted, and has been settled by the highest authority in
England, and by many cases in this country. Thus, where the
habits and mode of life of the father, or his treatment of his child,
are such as to affect injuriously the child's health or morals, or
endanger his property, the custody will be committed to a person
to act as guardian. Bispham's Equity, 486 and note.
The general theory upon which chancery assumes jurisdiction
over the persons and estates of minors is, that, by proper proceedings, the infant has been constituted a ward of court. Id. 484.
As to the manner in which a minor may be appointed a ward 6f
court, it is not necessary that there should be any suit actually
pending or bill filed; the object may be attained by petition : Id.
485.
In England the prerogative of the crown as parens patrice is
exercised by the court of chancery. In this country the State takes
the place of the King, and protects infants through chancery : Id.
483.
In Cowls v. Cowls, 3 Gilman (Ill.) 435, it was held that a court
of chancery is vested with a broad and comprehensive jurisdiction
over the persons and property of infants, and their parents who are
hound f6r their protection and maintenance, and will take such
action in relation to the charge of their persons, or the management of their property, as circumstances may require. That where
infants are taken from the custody of the fither by a court of chancery, and have no property of their own, the father being bound
for their support, may be required by order of court to contribute
to their maintenance, the court itself, or through a master, inquiring into his condition and circumstances.
In jib Cord v. Ochltree, 8 Blackf. 15, it was said that the necessitv for the existence of a power to the protection of minors, was
obvious, and would be implied from a general legislative or consti-

tutional grant of chancery powers.
In 3ifagquire v. Maguire, 7 Dana 181, the court, incidentally
remarked, that the protection of infants from brutal treatment by
their parents, formed a part of the original jurisdiction of chancery,
and as such might be exercised in this country as well as in England.
In the State v. Stigall, 2 Zabriskie's Rep. 286, the court cited
and relied upon 2 Story's Equity, sect. 1341, quoted above, as sustaining the same proposition.
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There are many cases cited in Leading Cases in Equity, White
& Tudor, vol. 2, part 2, 4 Am. ed., by J. I. Clark Hare, p. 1847,
sustaining the same proposition.
By statute, Gantt's Dig., sect. 3036, the probate court may
appoint a guardian for a minor, where the parents are adjudged
incompetent or unfit for the duties of guardian ; but this does not
interfere with the jurisdiction of a court of chancery to take from
the control of the father, the natural guardian, an abused and illtreated infant, and make it the ward of court by placing it in the
custody and care of some competent and humane person, to be
appointed by the court.
The bill or petition, in this case, whatever it may be called, discloses a tale of horror, shocking to humanity, and no doubt, presented a subject-matter within the jurisdiction of the court below,
sitting in chambers. See Bowles v. Dixon, 32 Ark. 96.
On what particular ground the court sustained the demurrer to
the bill does not appear, and appellees are not represented by counsel here.
If the court was of the opinion that the bill was improperly
brought in the name of the State, instead of in the name of the
abused infant, by some person as its next friend, which is no doubt
the usual and better practice, the bill, for such informality, should
not have been dismissed. Mr. Little and Mr. Sanders were no
doubt prompted by motives of humanity in bringing the matter
before the court, and might, on suggestion of the court, have
assumed, by an amendment of the bill, the attitude of its next
friend, or one of them might have done so, or if both had declined,
any other suitable person might have been substituted.
At the time the demurrer was sustained the court not only had
jurisdiction of the subject-matter brought to its notice by the bill,
but of the defendants who had entered their appearance, and the
child had been placed in the custody of a person to-take care of it,
pending the suit, and until the further order of the court.
To dismiss the bill for mere mistake in making the state a formal
plaintiff, on demurrer, without inquiry into the truth of the grave
charges made against the parents of the child, and permit it again
to be restored to them by the interlocutory custodian, was an error
for which the decree of dismissal must be reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings.

